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Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of globalisation on inclusive human development in 51 
African countries for the period 1996-2011 with particular emphasis on income levels (low 
income versus middle income), legal origins (English common law versus French civil law), 
resource wealth (oil-rich versus oil-poor), landlockedness (landlocked versus unlandlocked), 
religious domination (Christianity versus Islam) and political stability (stable versus unstable). 
The empirical evidence is based on instrumental variable panel Fixed effects and Tobit 
regressions in order to control for the unobserved heteroegeneity and limited range in the 
dependent variable. Political, economic, social and general globalisation variables are used. 
Six main hypotheses are investigated. The findings broadly show that middle income, English 
common law, oil-poor, unlandlocked, Christian-oriented and politically-stable countries are 
associated with comparatively higher levels of globalisation-driven inclusive human 
development. Puzzling findings are elucidated and policy implications discussed.   
 
JEL Classification: E60; F40; F59; D60; O55  
Keywords: Globalisation; inequality; inclusive development; Africa 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 There are three principal motivations for investigating the comparative economics of 
globalisation on inclusive human development in Africa. They are: (i) recent inclusive 
development trends and (ii) debates surrounding the  relationship between inclusive 
development and (iii) the contemporary relevance of making globalisation more inclusive and 
the need to present findings with more targeted policy implications that are based on some 
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fundamental features of inclusive human development. We engage these points in 
chronological order.  
 First, a World Bank report on attainment of Millennium Development Goal (MDGs) 
targets of extreme poverty has recently shown that with the exception of the African 
continent, poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world. In sub-Saharan Africa, 45% 
of countries were still considerably off-track from the achieving the MDGs extreme poverty 
targets (see World Bank, 2015). This dismal evidence on Africa substantially contrasts with 
statistics that the continent has been enjoying more than two decades of resurgence in growth 
that began in the mid 1990s (see Fosu, 2015a).  It also sharply contrasts with optimistic 
discourses on and narrative of ‘Africa rising’ (Leautier, 2012) as well as premature 
conclusions that all African countries, with the exception of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, had reached the MDGs extreme poverty target by the end of 2014 or one year ahead 
of time (Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014). Obeng-Odoom (2015) has attributed the contrast 
to policies of neoliberalism and globalisation that are more focused on increasing the 
relevance of capital accumulation and the neoliberal ideology, with less concern to more 
fundamental ethnical issues like environmental degradation and inequality.  
 Second, there is yet no consensus in the literature on the appeals of globalisation in 
development outcomes. Whereas growing financial and economic instability has been 
documented as resulting from increasing globalisation, there is also some evidence on the 
potential rewards of globalisation in terms of allocation efficiency and international risk 
sharing (Price & Elu, 2014; Kose et al., 2006, 2011; Asongu, 2014a). The contemporary 
economic landscape has been characterised by two main trends in the past thirty years, 
notably: growing inequality and increasing globalisation (Azzimonti et al., 2014). Within the 
same period, the concern about exclusive development has been  an increasing concern in 
developed nations (Atkinson et al., 2011;  Piketty, 2014), a broad sample of developing 
countries (Mlachila et al., 2014; Mthuli et al., 2014; Fosu, 2010a) as well as in African 
countries (Fosu, 2008, 2009, 2010b, 2010c).  
 Third, the sustainable development agenda in the post-2015 era is articulated by a 
policy syndrome of an increasingly globalised world that is less inclusive in terms of human 
development (UN, 2013, pp. 7-13). Accordingly, the ineluctable globalisation process was 
initiated with the promise of economic development (Tchamyou, 2015). Unfortunately, this 
phenomenon is threatening to disfigure the human face because it endangers the progress of 
nations and people, it advocates market over governments and self interest over altruism. It is 
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therefore unsurprising that public support for the phenomenon is decreasing both  in 
developing and developed nations, with fervent explorations of alternatives to the morally-
disturbing side of the capitalism-driven globalisation  (Asongu, 2013; Kenneth & Himes, 
2008; Stiglitz, 2007).  
 In the light of the above, this inquiry extends the literature that has been responding to 
the World Bank report on the African continent’s extreme poverty tragedy. We complement 
the existing literature by investigating the impact of globalisation on inclusive development 
with particular emphasis on some fundamental characteristics of comparative inclusive human 
development. From intuition, findings from comparative economic development are more 
likely to produce more targeted policy implications. Hence, in order to provide room for more 
policy options, the dataset is disaggregated into the fundamental characteristics of human 
development based on: income levels (low income and middle income); legal origins (English 
Common law and French Civil law); religious domination (Christianity and Islam); openness 
to sea (landlocked and unlandlocked); resource-wealth (oil-rich and oil-poor) and political 
stability (stable and unstable).  
 The existing literature (on responses to the World Bank report) which this inquiry 
extends can be discussed in three main strands: (i) novel paradigms of development and 
insights into Africa’s resurgence in growth; (ii) the reinvention of development assistance for 
the purposes of inclusive development and (iii) the role of globalisation in inclusive human 
development. In the first strand, Fosu (2015bc) edited a book with numerous articles that are 
focused on examining whether the recent growth experience by African counties is  myth or 
reality. Kuada (2015) has also designed a book that elicits Africa’s extreme poverty tragedy. 
The author recommends a paradigm shift from ‘strong economics’ (or debates on neoliberal 
policies) to ‘soft economics’ (or human capability development) as a mechanism to 
understanding the recent trends in poverty experienced across the board. In the second part, 
the proposals of Kuada (2015) are consistent with a stream of the literature that is suggesting 
some mechanisms by which foreign aid can be reinvented for the purposes of enhancing 
sustainable development, greater employment and less poverty (see Jones et al., 2015; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016a; Simpasa et al., 2015; Page & Söderbom, 2015; Asongu, 2015a; Jones 
& Tarp, 2015; Fields, 2015; Page & Shimeles, 2015). The third element which is closest to 
the present study has focused on the link between globalisation and inclusive development, 
with a notable study by Azzimonti et al. (2014) which has theorized that globalisation-fuelled 
debts are a fundamental cause of exclusive development in advanced economies. The 
5 
 
empirical validity of the theory has been partially confirmed in Africa (see Asongu et al., 
2015).  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. The theoretical underpinnings and 
testable hypotheses are presented in Section 2. The data and methodology are discussed in 
Section 3 while Section 4 covers the presentation of results and policy implications. Section 5 
concludes with future research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings and testable hypotheses  
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings  
 There are two main theoretical underpinnings on the relationship between 
globalisation and inclusive development: the hegemony and neoliberal perspectives (see Tsai, 
2006). According to hegemonic perspective, the phenomenon of globalisation is a 
surreptitious project that aims to create a new order in the world which is dictated by global 
forces like industrial countries and powerful financial institutions. According to this thought, 
a main goal of globalisation is to ease capital accumulation and extend the benefits of 
openness from trade in commodities (good and services) to trade in financial assets. Authors 
in the stream foresee ‘a world-wide crisis of living standards for labor’, given that the process 
of capital liberalisation has been shouldered by the working class because ‘technological 
change and economic reconversion endemic to capitalist development has generated an 
enormous growing pool of surplus labor, an industrial reserve army with incomes at or below 
the level of subsistence’ (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001, p. 24).  
 There is another side to  the hegemonic perspective maintaining that the modes of 
production by policies of neoliberalism are oriented towards a dynamic production process 
that undermines mechanisms of redistribution that were advocated by Keynesian Social 
democracy. According to Smart (2003), the phenomenon of globalisation is more friendly to 
the quest for private interest, while paying less attention to more ethical concerns like 
inclusive development. In essence, the process of distributing the rewards accruing from 
globalisation is skewed to the advantage of the wealthy segments of the population who are 
already in advantageous positions from socio-economic standpoints (Scholte, 2000). The 
perspective of Scholte is shared by Sirgy et al (2004), though in a less radical tone.  
 The neoliberal or second school disputes that globalisation is an instrument of 
‘creative destruction’ in the view that technological innovation, cross-border investment and 
global trade improve production efficiency and make considerable progress despite falling 
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wages for unskilled workers and job substitution.  The inconveniences of globalisation are 
managed by requesting unskilled workers to acquire new skills in order to benefit from 
openness. From the perspective of Grennes (2003), such rewards can benefit the masses if 
‘supply and demand’ affects the market of labour.  
 
2.2 Testable hypotheses for comparative human development  
 We discuss the testable hypotheses for the comparative inclusive human development 
in terms of income levels, legal origins, religious domination, openness to sea, natural 
resources and political stability. Recent inclusive development literature has employed these 
fundamental characteristics for comparative development (see Mlachila et al., 2014).  
 First, compared to middle income countries, low income countries are more likely to 
be associated with less effective institutions that oversee the equitable distribution of the fruits 
of economic prosperity. There are two principal motivations for the positive association 
between income levels and higher inclusive development. On the one hand, higher income 
provides more avenues for social mobility and employment. On the other, institutions have 
been documented to positively influence growth quality (Mlachila et al., 2014; Fosu, 2015bc), 
especially in terms of enhancing standards of living by means of better management of 
resources (Fosu, 2013ab; Fonchingong, 2014; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014) and 
consolidation of the foundations for social change  (Efobi, 2015). 
Hypothesis 1: Compared to low income countries, middle income countries have higher levels 
of inclusive human development.  
 
 Second, legal origins are crucial in contemporary comparative development (see La 
Porta et al., 1998, 1999). The African continent is therefore not an exception to this assertion 
(see Agbor, 2015). In essence, French Civil law and English Common law countries differ in 
how legal origins affect institutions because of differences in political and adaptability 
mechanisms (see Beck et al., 2003). In Africa, legal origins have been recently documented to 
affect welfare (Asongu, 2015). According to the description, whereas countries with French 
Civil Law place more emphasis on the power of the state, English Common Law is more 
concerned with consolidating private property rights which is likely to improve conditions 
that reduce economic vulnerability and increase the social mobility needed for inclusive 
development. In essence, the institutional web of formal rules, informal norms and 
characteristics of enforcement affect economic vulnerability and social mobility within a 
country.  
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Hypothesis 2: English Common Law countries have higher levels of inclusive human 
development compared to their French Civil Law counterparts.  
 
Third, from intuition, politically stable countries are more likely to create better 
conditions for inclusive development compared to their politically unstable counterparts. The 
insight is consistent with Beegle et al. (2016, p.10) who have concluded that fragility is 
associated with significantly slower poverty reduction in Africa. While this perception is 
sound, it has to be ascertained with empirical justification. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Politically stable countries are associated with higher levels of inclusive 
development, relative to politically unstable countries.  
 
 Fourth, whereas the prospect of higher inclusive development  in resource-rich 
countries is consistent with the hypothesis on income-wealth, there are also strong reasons to 
suggest that countries that have acknowledged scarcity in natural resources have focused 
more on human capability development as means to achieving growth and inclusive 
development (Fosu, 2013b; America, 2013;  Amavilah, 2015). This assertion is in line with 
the Kuada (2015) paradigm on ‘soft economics’ as a means to understanding Africa’s poverty 
tragedy.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Resource-poor countries are associated with higher levels of inclusive 
development, compared to their resource-wealthy counterparts  
 
 Fifth, landlockedness has institutional and economic (Arvis et al., 2007) costs which 
are very likely to influence economic prosperity, economic vulnerability, social mobility and 
the distribution of the fruits of economic prosperity. In essence, the institutional cost, inter 
alia; should intuitively be connected with less economic governance: the formulation and 
implementation of effective policies that deliver public commodities for inclusive 
development.   
 
Hypothesis 5: Landlocked countries are associated with lower levels of inclusive development 
compared to countries that are opened to the sea.   
 
 We also use religious domination as a fundamental characteristic of comparative 
inclusive human development. This is essentially because the basis for religious supremacy is 
founded on the supposition that solidarity affects inclusiveness. The two dominant models of 
such solidarity in Africa are Christianity and Islam. Compared to countries with Islam-
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domination that are traditionally more conservative with regard to neoliberalism, Christian-
dominated countries are less conformist with respect to the neoliberal ideology. Such could 
influence the choice of neoliberal policies in globalisation for inclusive human development 
(Roudometof, 2014).  
 
Hypothesis 6: Christian-dominated countries are associated with higher levels of inclusive 
development, compared to their Islam-oriented counterparts.   
 
In the light of the above, the selected fundamental characteristics have some influence 
on the adoption of neoliberal and/or globalisation policies which ultimately affect economic 
prosperity and inclusive human development.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 In this study, we assess a panel of 51 African countries with data for the period 1996-
2011 from Dreher et al. (2010); African Development Indicators of the World Bank and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The sampled countries and periodicity are 
due to data availability constraints. Consistent with recent African inclusive development 
literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), the inequality adjusted human development index 
(IHDI) from the UNDP is used as a proxy for inclusive development. The IHDI is the national 
average of achievements in three main areas, namely: (i) knowledge; (ii) health and long life 
and (iii) reasonable standards of living. In addition to accounting for average rewards in terms 
of health, education and income, the IHDI also accounts for the distribution of underlying 
achievements among the population by controlling for mean values of each dimension with 
regards to inequality.  
 Globalisation indicators from Dreher et al (2010) are the independent variables of 
interest.  These are economic, social, political and general globalisation. The control variables 
which are from African Development Indicators are also selected in accordance with the 
literature on inclusive development (Mishra et al., 2011; Anand et al., 2012; Seneviratne & 
Sun, 2013; Mlachila et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c). The control variables are: 
public investment, GDP growth, inflation and development assistance. Economic prosperity is 
expected to positively influence inclusive development (Mlachila et al., 2014). While 
development assistance has been shown to negatively affect inclusive human development 
when ‘types of aid’ are considered, both positive and negative impacts are apparent (Asongu 
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& Nwachukwu, 2016a). Public investment could either have a negative or positive effect 
contingent on whether funds are mismanaged and/or if corrupt channels are involved in 
processes of disbursing funds for inclusive development goals. Chaotic inflation reduces 
inclusive development because compared to the rich, whose purchasing power is not 
substantially affected, the poor bore a greater burden in terms of decreasing purchasing 
power. Appendix 1 provides the definitions of variables while Appendix 2 discloses the 
summary statistics. The correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 3.  
 The awareness for the choice of fundamental characteristics for comparative human 
development has been covered in Section 2
1
. The selection criteria for these fundamental 
features are consistent with recent literature on inclusive growth in developing countries 
(Mlachila et al., 2014, p. 13) and African human development (Asongu, 2014c, p.339). 
Accordingly, classification of countries in terms of legal traditions is from La Porta et al. 
(2008, p 289) and categorisation of nations by income levels is consistent with Asongu 
(2014b, p. 364)
2
 on the World Bank classification. Resource-wealth is exclusively based on 
oil-dominated exports representing at least 30 percent of GDP for at least a decade in the 
sampled periodicity. Landlocked and unlandlocked countries are apparent from an African 
map while classification of religious domination is from the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) World Fact Book (CIA, 2011). Politically unstable countries are those that have 
experienced political instability/violence for at least half of the sampled periodicity. The 
categorisation of countries is presented in Appendix 4.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 Consistent with recent inclusive development literature that has used the IHDI, we 
adopt both Tobit and Fixed effects (FE) regressions in order to respectively account for the 
limited range in the dependent variable and the unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, 
instrumental variable (IV) FE and Tobit estimations are used. Contrary to the underlying 
study that has also employed the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to control for 
persistence in inclusive human development, we cannot employ the GMM here because T>N 
for some fundamental characteristics.  It is important to note that a basic requirement for the 
                                                          
1
 It is important to note that, whereas the motivations for the choice of fundamental characteristics are the 
testable hypotheses that are derived hereafter in Section 2, the criteria for the selection of fundamental 
characteristics are now engaged.  
2
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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application of GMM is T<N. Accordingly, whereas T is equal to 16 years (or 1996-2011) 
some panels encompass countries that are less than T. These include inter alia: landlocked 
and conflict-affected countries.   
 The concern of simultaneity and/or reverse causality is addressed by instrumenting the 
globalisation variables of interest with their first lags. This instrumentation process is 
summarised in Eq. (1) below.  
 
  titijti GG ,1,,                                                                         (1) 
Where: tiG , , is a globalisation  indicator of country i  
at  period t ,  1, tiG , represents  
globalisation  in country i
 
at  period 1t ,  is a constant and ti ,  the error term.  The 
instrumentation procedure consists of regressing the independent variables of interest on their 
first lags and then saving the fitted values that are subsequently used as the main independent 
variables in Eq. (2) and Eq. (4) for the FE and Tobit regressions respectively. The 
specifications are Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard 
errors.  
 
 The panel FE model is presented as follows in Eq. (2) 
tiitih
h
htiti WIVGIHD ,,,
4
1
,10,    

                                         (2) 
Where: tiIHD ,  
is inclusive human development of country i
 
at  period t ;  is a constant;
 
IVG , instrumented globalisation; W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP growth, Foreign 
aid, Public investment and Inflation);
 i

 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 Given that the range of the IHDI is theoretically between 0 and 1 (0.127 to 0.809 as in 
this study), Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) may be inappropriate. In order to control for the 
limited range in the dependent variable, Tobit models are a good fit (Kumbhakar & Lovell, 
2000; Koetter et al., 2008; Ariss, 2010; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). In accordance with 
McDonald (2009) and Coccorese and Pellecchia if there are no observations of either 0 or 1 
for the dependent variable (which is the case with  the IHDI in this study), estimating by a 
double-censored Tobit model is similar to estimating by a linear regression model because the 
two likelihood functions coincide. Therefore, the logistic regression associated with the Tobit 
model is as follows in Eq. (3):  
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
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


'
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                                                             (3)
 
where itx  is the same vector of regressors used in the Tobit model,   is the vector of 
parameters  and it is  independently and identically distributed (iid) with mean zero and 
variance ² variance.  
The standard Tobit model (Tobin, 1958; Carsun & Sun, 2007) is as follows in Eq. (4): 
                                    tititi Xy ,,0
*
,      (4) 
 
where *,tiy is a latent response variable, tiX ,  
is an observed k1
 
vector of explanatory 
variables  and ti,  
i.i.d. N(0, σ2) and is an independent variable  of tiX , . Instead of 
observing *,tiy , we observe tiy , as follows in Eq. (5):   
                                                          
,,0
*
,
*
,
*
,,
,








ti
titi
ti
y
y
if
ify
y
 
     (5) 
 
where  is a non stochastic constant. In other words, the value of *,tiy is missing when it is less 
than or equal to   . 
 
4. Empirical Results  
4.1 Presentation of baseline results  
The baseline results are presented in Table 1. The left-hand-side presents instrumental 
variable (IV) FE regressions whereas the right-hand-side shows findings from corresponding 
instrumental variable (IV) Tobit estimations. It is apparent that globalisation consistently 
improves inclusive development, with the lowest effect from political globalisation and 
highest impact from general globalisation. The significant control variables display the 
expected signs.  
Table 2 and Table 3 respectively decompose the IV FE  and Tobit regressions into 
fundamental characteristics. For either table, Panel A, Panel B, Panel C and Panel D 
respectively present findings related to political, economic, social and general globalisation. 
Based on the findings in Table 2, the investigated hypotheses are confirmed in the following 
order of comparative significance: political globalisation; general governance; economic 
globalisation and social globalisation. In the Tobit regressions, the tested hypotheses are 
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overwhelmingly confirmed. In addition, the panel on social globalisation (or Panel C) which 
did not show overwhelming comparative significance in the FE regressions (see Table 2) now 
has many comparative pairs which are significant. The significant control variables have the 
expected signs.  
 
 
Table 1: Baseline Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects and Tobit regressions 
          
 Dependent variable: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) 
         
 Fixed Effects Tobit 
         
Constant  1.443*** 1.513*** 1.502*** 1.379*** 1.304 -3.840** -1.543 -6.888*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.397) (0.011) (0.252) (0.000) 
Political Glob. (IV) 0.003*** --- --- --- 0.042** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.042)    
Economic Glob.(IV) --- 0.004** --- --- --- 0.177*** --- --- 
  (0.013)    (0.000)   
Social Glob. (IV) --- --- 0.005** --- --- --- 0.170*** --- 
   (0.038)    (0.000)  
Globalisation(Glob) (IV) --- --- --- 0.006*** --- --- --- 0.242*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.001 0.0008 0.001 0.0008 0.056 0.048 0.054 0.039 
 (0.573) (0.735) (0.574) (0.722) (0.531) (0.585) (0.536) (0.654) 
Foreign aid  0.00005 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.112*** -0.040 -0.026 -0.005 
 (0.971) (0.901) (0.803) (0.877) (0.005) (0.327) (0.537) (0.898) 
Public Investment  -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.218** -0.293*** -0.245*** -0.279*** 
 (0.635) (0.924) (0.930) (0.657) (0.020) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) 
Inflation -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.679) (0.735) (0.704) (0.681) (0.676) (0.651) (0.626) (0.562) 
         
Adjusted  R²(within) 0.031 0.016 0.011 0.030 --- --- --- --- 
Fisher  2.71** 1.36 0.99 2.62** --- --- --- --- 
LR Chi-Square  --- --- --- --- 22.15*** 52.88*** 42.19*** 55.58*** 
Log Likelihood --- --- --- --- -1532.431 -1484.800 -1522.408 -1515.714 
Countries  35 33 35 35 --- --- --- --- 
Observations  453 442 453 453 453 442 453 453 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable.  
 
 
 
2: Comparative economics with Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects 
             
 Panel A: Political globalisation    
             
 Income levels Legal origins Religion Openness to sea Oil exports Political stability 
 LI MI Eng. Frch. Christ. Islam Open Closed Oil Nonoil Stable Unstable 
             
Constant  0.242*** 3.128*** 3.546*** 0.283*** 2.010*** 0.291*** 2.331*** 0.249*** 0.407*** 1.649*** 1.753*** 0.241*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Glob (IV) 0.002*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.033) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.001*** 0.004 0.002 0.0004 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001*** 0.0009** 0.001 0.0001 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.623) (0.753) (0.110) (0.700) (0.018) (0.824) (0.001) (0.010) (0.724) (0.961) (0.000) 
Foreign aid  -0.0001 0.001 0.006 -0.0002 0.0001 0.002 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.001* 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0003 
 (0.302) (0.940) (0.556) (0.186) (0.925) (0.533) (0.835) (0.325) (0.051) (0.875) (0.881) (0.304) 
Public Investment  0.0008 -0.003 -0.010 0.002*** -0.005 0.0001 -0.003 0.0002 0.002*** -0.004 -0.002 0.002* 
 (0.204) (0.625) (0.404) (0.000) (0.400) (0.580) (0.616) (0.739) (0.000) (0.372) (0.620) (0.096) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.000*** -0.0003 -0.000 -0.001 -
0.000*** 
 (0.002) (0.357) (0.679) (0.212) (0.710) (0.580) (0.803) (0.003) (0.299) (0.680) (0.619) (0.002) 
Adjusted  R²(within) 0.523 0.039 0.036 0.591 0.030 0.527 0.030 0.521 0.538 0.034 0.033 0.492 
Fisher  54.16*** 1.32 1.08 77.09*** 1.77 28.57*** 1.43 39.04*** 14.23*** 2.46** 2.23* 15.72*** 
Countries  21 14 12 23 23 12 20 15 6 29 28 7 
Observations  273 180 159 294 308 145 254 199 72 381 360 93 
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 Panel B: Economic  globalisation 
 LI MI Eng. Frch. Christ. Islam Open Closed Oil Nonoil Stable Unstable 
             
Constant 0.241*** 3.45*** 3.724*** 0.284*** 2.017*** 0.349*** 2.553*** 0.249*** 0.376*** 1.712*** 1.834*** 0.262*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic Glob(IV) 0.002*** 0.005 0.004 0.003*** 0.004* 0.002*** 0.004* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.002*** 
 (0.000° (0.181) (0.259) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.027) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.0006* 0.002 0.002 0.00006 0.001 -0.0002 0.0008 0.0009* -0.00008 0.001 0.001 0.0007* 
 (0.072) (0.794) (0.783) (0.859) (0.655) (0.546) (0.882) (0.062) (0.755) (0.668) (0.768) (0.081) 
Foreign aid  -0.0003* -0.0007 0.002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 
 (0.077) (0.956) (0.831) (0.382) (0.925) (0.153) (0.859) (0.745) (0.194) (0.894) (0.951) (0.574) 
Public Investment 0.003*** -0.003 -0.007 0.003*** -0.001 0.001** -0.002 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.0006 -0.0001 0.0008 
 (0.000) (0.638) (0.563) (0.000) (0.799) (0.015) (0.653) (0.002) (0.006) (0.906) (0.980) (0.552) 
Inflation -0.000** -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.0009** -0.00005 -0.000* 0.0006** -0.000 -0.0008 -
0.000*** 
 (0.025) (0.477) (0.791) (0.901) (0.772) (0.013) (0.892) (0.053) (0.018) (0.755) (0.697) (0.005) 
Adjusted  R²(within) 0.353 0.017 0.014 0.434 0.014 0.474 0.016 0.229 0.749 0.015 0.016 0.414 
Fisher  26.30*** 0.56 0.40 39.41*** 0.83 21.52*** 0.72 10.68*** 34.71*** 1.10 1.07 11.45*** 
Countries  20 13 12 21 23 10 18 15 5 28 26 7 
Observations  266 176 159 283 308 134 243 199 68 374 346 93 
             
             
 Panel C: Social globalisation 
 LI MI Eng. Frch. Christ. Islam Open Closed Oil Nonoil Stable Unstable 
             
Constant  0.218*** 3.450*** 3.843*** 0.250*** 2.088*** 0.270*** 2.519*** 0.182*** 0.401*** 1.710*** 1.826*** 0.244*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Social Glob (IV) 0.006*** 0.004 0.002 0.006*** 0.004 0.006*** 0.004 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.005* 0.005* 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.432) (0.706) (0.000) (0.240) (0.000) (0.280) (0.000) (0.000) (0.077) (0.073) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.0007** 0.003 0.004 0.0001 0.002 -0.0001 0.001 0.001*** 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.0009** 
 (0.018) (0.702) (0.617) (0.504) (0.529) (0.603) (0.746) (0.008) (0.914) (0.512) (0.689) (0.020) 
Foreign aid  -0.0006 
*** 
0.001 0.002 -0.0002* -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003* 
 (0.000) (0.933) (0.814) (0.059) (0.883) (0.270) (0.809) (0.630) (0.146) (0.820) (0.975) (0.096) 
Public Investment 0.002*** -0.002 -0.007 0.002*** -0.002 0.001** -0.001 0.001* 0.001*** -0.001 -0.0004 0.002* 
 (0.002) (0.746) (0.573) (0.000) (0.727) (0.013) (0.818) (0.080) (0.003) (0.836) (0.928) (0.077) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.004 -0.000 0.00003 -0.000 0.0002 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.0001 -0.000 -0.0008 -
0.000*** 
 (0.002) (0.391) (0.784) (0.193) (0.752) (0.228) (0.942) (0.002) (0.525) (0.725) (0.674) (0.003) 
             
Adjusted  R²(within) 0.512 0.009 0.006 0.672 0.007 0.770 0.006 0.507 0.767 0.010 0.010 0.400 
Fisher  51.88*** 0.31 0.17 109.25*** 0.40 86.14*** 0.28 36.82*** 40.16*** 0.75 0.72 10.80*** 
Countries  21 14 12 23 23 12 20 15 6 29 28 7 
Observations  273 180 159 294 308 145 254 199 72 381 360 93 
             
             
 Panel D: Globalisation 
 LI MI Eng. Frch. Christ. Islam Open Closed Oil Nonoil Stable Unstable 
             
Constant  0.186*** 3.167*** 3.538*** 0.217*** 1.927*** 0.223*** 2.320*** 0.168*** 0.356*** 1.573*** 1.672*** 0.214*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Globalisation(IV) 0.004*** 0.009* 0.008 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.050) (0.102) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.0006** 0.003 0.002 0.0001 0.001 0.00005 0.0009 0.0008** 0.0003* 0.001 0.0004 0.001*** 
 (0.031) (0.712) (0.779) (0.460) (0.706) (0.843) (0.869) (0.019) (0.071) (0.731) (0.909) (0.003) 
Foreign aid  -0.0003** 0.0004 0.003 -0.0002* -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0005 0.00007 -
0.0007** 
-0.0001 0.0004 -0.0002 
 (0.033) (0.976) (0.774) (0.063) (0.906) (0.243) (0.824) (0.852) (0.031) (0.915) (0.899) (0.204) 
Public Investment 0.001** -0.004 -0.007 0.001*** -0.003 0.0007* -0.003 0.001 0.001*** -0.002 -0.001 0.0007 
 (0.019) (0.572) (0.546) (0.000) (0.574) (0.085) (0.578) (0.133) (0.000) (0.603) (0.699) (0.524) 
Inflation -0.000*** -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.0007*** -0.00004 -0.000*** 0.0002 -0.000 -0.001 -
0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.458) (0.744) (0.798) (0.724) (0.002) (0.917) (0.002) (0.200) (0.697) (0.614) (0.001) 
             
Adjusted  R²(within) 0.615 0.029 0.023 0.748 0.026 0.794 0.025 0.565 0.837 0.030 0.031 0.558 
Fisher  79.09*** 0.97 0.69 157.89*** 1.50 98.71*** 1.18 46.64*** 62.86*** 2.19*** 2.09* 20.50*** 
Countries  21 14 12 23 23 12 20 15 6 29 28 7 
Observations  273 180 159 294 308 145 254 199 72 381 360 93 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. Glob: Globalisation. LI: Low Income. MI: Middle 
Income. Eng. English common law. Frch: French civil law. Christ: Christian-dominated. Islam: Islam-oriented. Open: Unlandlocked. Closed: 
Landlocked. Oil: petroleum exporting. Nonoil: Non petroleum exporting. Stable: Politically stable. Unstable: Politically unstable.  
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Table 3: Comparative economics with Instrumental Variable Tobit regressions 
             
 Panel A: Political globalisation    
             
 Income levels  Legal origins  Religion Openness to sea Oil exports Political stability 
 LI MI Eng. Frch. Christ. Islam Open Closed Oil Nonoil Stable Unstable 
             
Constant  0.318*** 4.289 -2.347 0.294*** -0.844 0.450*** 2.998 0.479*** 0.350*** 2.204 0.218*** 3.203 
 (0.000) (0.282) (0.572) (0.000) (0.696) (0.000) (0.335) (0.000) (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.109) 
Political Glob (IV) 0.001*** 0.073 0.189*** 0.002*** 0.102*** 0.001*** 0.038 -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.039 0.002*** 0.035 
 (0.001) (0.100) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.344) (0.000) (0.004) (0.103) (0.000) (0.165) 
GDP growth 0.003*** -0.238 0.043 0.0006 0.172 0.0003 0.018 0.003** -0.0004 0.126 0.005*** 0.036 
 (0.003) (0.488) (0.863) (0.666) (0.212) (0.795) (0.931) (0.020) (0.828) (0.294) (0.000) (0.800) 
Foreign aid  -0.002*** -
0.868*** 
-
0.517*** 
-0.006*** -0.160*** -0.023*** -0.142** -0.005*** -0.014 
*** 
-
0.132*** 
-
0.001*** 
-
0.216*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) 
Public Investment 0.001 -0.457** -0.241 0.003*** -0.293* 0.006*** -0.301* 0.008*** 0.010*** -0.298** 0.001 -
0.314*** 
 (0.366) (0.019) (0.434) (0.009) (0.052) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.591) (0.007) 
Inflation -0.010** 0.166 -0.0002 -0.0003 
*** 
-0.0001 -0.001 -0.014 -0.000 -0.0007 -0.0001 -
0.000*** 
0.088 
 (0.010) (0.317) (0.569) (0.008) (0.619) (0.162) (0.343) (0.225) (0.634) (0.683) (0.007) (0.173) 
LR Chi-Square  50.43*** 18.89*** 27.40*** 192.54*** 28.71*** 255.67*** 11.65** 79.65*** 72.80*** 22.45*** 45.34*** 27.46*** 
Log Likelihood 315.841 -680.078 -604.221 265.399 -1091.346 183.124 -928.278 206.736 73.713 -1318.43 123.828 -1251.97 
Observations  273 180 159 294 308 145 254 199 72 381 93 360 
             
             
 Panel B: Economic  globalisation 
 LI MI Eng. Frch. Christ. Islam Open Closed Oil Nonoil Stable Unstable 
             
Constant 0.261*** -8.129* -7.631* 0.268*** -3.856* 0.362*** -10.96*** 0.148*** 0.374*** -4.359** -
3.362*** 
0.281*** 
 (0.000) (0.052) (0.059) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.111) (0.000) 
Economic Glob(IV) 0.003*** 0.352*** 0.403*** 0.005*** 0.199*** 0.005*** 0.383*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.197*** 0.193*** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) 
GDP growth 0.002*** -0.040 0.019 0.0004 0.165 -0.002** -0.017 0.002*** -0.002 0.089 0.016 0.004*** 
 (0.005) (0.904) (0.936) (0.759) (0.218) (0.040) (0.933) (0.007) (0.150) (0.442) (0.908) (0.000) 
Foreign aid  -0.002*** -0.518* -0.106 -0.006*** -0.064 -0.020*** -0.074 -0.001* -0.014*** -0.045 -0.071 -
0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.058) (0.470) (0.000) (0.248) (0.000) (0.256) (0.088) (0.000) (0.347) (0.305) (0.000) 
Public Investment 0.001 -
0.753*** 
-
1.230*** 
0.002 -0.433*** 0.002* -0.479*** 0.004*** 0.005** -
0.331*** 
-
0.380*** 
0.001 
 (0.154) (0.000) (0.000) (0.124) (0.004) (0.064) (0.003) (0.006) (0.019) (0.009) (0.002) (0.525) 
Inflation -0.000*** 0.075 -0.0003 -0.0004 
*** 
-0.000 0.0001 -0.009 -0.000** 0.0003 -0.0001 0.010 -0.000** 
 (0.006) (0.615) (0.482) (0.000) (0.693) (0.866) (0.501) (0.015) (0.817) (0.664) (0.873) (0.024) 
Adjusted  
R²(within) 
88.64*** 39.76*** 40.23*** 211.22*** 42.85*** 290.07*** 56.62*** 161.13*** 66.24*** 50.13*** 48.89*** 36.89*** 
Fisher  325.234 -656.069 -597.807 278.054 -1084.27 198.932 -870.266 247.476 76.829 -1283.45 -1207.70 119.601 
Observations  266 176 159 283 308 134 243 199 68 374 349 93 
             
             
 Panel C: Social globalisation 
 LI MI Eng. Frch. Christ. Islam Open Closed Oil Nonoil Stable Unstable 
             
Constant  0.248*** 1.238 -2.627 0.211*** -2.621 0.386*** -2.953 0.121*** 0.191*** -1.006 -0.590 0.271*** 
 (0.000) (0.786) (0.519) (0.000) (0.155) (0.000) (0.217) (0.000) (0.000) (0.550) (0.777) (0.000) 
Social Glob (IV) 0.005*** 0.191** 0.197 0.008*** 0.252*** 0.005*** 0.255*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.034) (0.438) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.003*** -0.127 -0.053 -0.0002 0.165 0.00003 -0.007 0.004*** -0.001 0.102 0.028 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.711) (0.755) (0.859) (0.217) (0.976) (0.970) (0.000) (0.235) (0.383) (0.843) (0.000) 
Foreign aid  -0.002*** -0.620** -0.934 
*** 
-0.004*** -0.041 -0.018*** -0.030 -0.001* -0.008*** -0.033 -0.080 -
0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.465) (0.000) (0.674) (0.057) (0.000) (0.532) (0.284) (0.002) 
Public Investment 0.001 -
0.507*** 
-0.0003 0.005*** -0.385*** 0.007*** -0.371** 0.006*** 0.003** -0.318** -
0.302*** 
0.0007 
 (0.143) (0.009) (0.519) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.753) 
Inflation -0.000*** 0.126 -0.0003 -0.00001 -0.000 -0.0001 0.001 -0.000*** 0.0007 -0.0001 0.048 -
0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.424) (0.519) (0.924) (0.599) (0.866) (0.935) (0.001) (0.474) (0.646) (0.461) (0.005) 
             
LR Chi-Square  115.05*** 20.69*** 28.52*** 346.81*** 44.27*** 302.16*** 29.02*** 220.57*** 124.84*** 36.08*** 37.25*** 46.91*** 
Log Likelihood 348.152 -679.179 -603.665 342.538 -1083.56 206.373 -919.593 277.196 99.731 -1311.62 -1247.08 124.615 
Observations  273 180 159 294 308 145 254 199 72 381 360 93 
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 Panel D:  Globalisation 
 LI  MI Eng. Frch. Christ. Islam Open Closed Oil Nonoil Stable Unstable 
             
Constant  0.205*** -
19.06*** 
-
21.70*** 
0.108*** -
10.972*** 
0.276*** 0.141*** -
13.497*** 
0.091 -
7.202*** 
-
9.108*** 
0.232*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.125) (0.202) (0.002) (0.000) 
Globalisation(IV) 0.004*** 0.531*** 0.692*** 0.008*** 0.370*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.410*** 0.010*** 0.258*** 0.305*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.002*** -0.056 0.134 -0.0001 0.113 0.0002 0.003*** -0.014 0.0001 0.047 -0.021 0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.862) (0.563) (0.900) (0.386) (0.865) (0.005) (0.943) (0.903) (0.683) (0.875) (0.000) 
Foreign aid  -0.001*** -0.348 -0.058 -0.004*** -0.011 -0.018*** -0.002*** -0.003 -0.011*** 0.0002 -0.005 -
0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.215) (0.673) (0.000) (0.839) (0.000) (0.000) (0.965) (0.000) (0.997) (0.944) (0.002) 
Public Investment 0.0009 -
0.579*** 
-1.00*** 0.003*** -0.410*** 0.006*** 0.004** -0.432*** 0.005*** -
0.335*** 
-
0.323*** 
0.001 
 (0.462) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.011) (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.005) (0.153) 
Inflation -0.000*** 0.292* -0.0003 -0.0002* -0.0002 0.0005 -0.000*** 0.002 0.002 -0.0001 0.005 -
0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.060) (0.403) (0.083) (0.498) (0.575) (0.009) (0.841) (0.110) (0.559) (0.933) (0.008) 
             
LR Chi-Square  103.51*** 39.74*** 54.12*** 311.61*** 60.49*** 309.36*** 111.13*** 43.25*** 106.69*** 48.99*** 52.82*** 45.43*** 
Log Likelihood 342.384 -669.651 -590.860 324.935 -1075.45 209.970 222.476 -912.477 90.659 -1305.16 -1239.30 123.874 
Observations  273 180 159 294 308 145 199 254 72 381 360 93 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. Glob: Globalisation. LI: Low Income. MI: Middle 
Income. Eng. English common law. Frch: French civil law. Christ: Christian-dominated. Islam: Islam-oriented. Open: Unlandlocked. Closed: 
Landlocked. Oil: petroleum exporting. Nonoil: Non petroleum exporting. Stable: Politically stable. Unstable: Politically unstable.  
 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications  
  The positive nexus between globalisation and inclusive development can be elicited 
from the perspective that the two measurements have theoretical bases that are founded on the 
efficient and optimal allocation and/distribution of resources. On the one hand, the measure 
for inclusive development appreciates how three principal achievements (income, education 
and health) within an economy are distributed among the population, by taking into account 
inequality. On the other hand, the neoliberal school on globalisation discussed in Section 2 is 
based on the imperative of optimal allocation of global resources for economic development.  
 The established positive connection is in accordance with Firebaugh (2004) who has 
advocated that the phenomenon of globalisation is tailored to lift developing countries out of 
poverty and enhance their human development standards. On a lighter note, the findings do 
not broadly align with the conclusions from indirect assessments by Asongu et al (2015) and 
Azzimonti et al. (2014).  
 It is also important to devote space to elucidating the puzzle of resource-rich countries 
experiencing low levels of inclusive human development compared with their resource-poor 
counterparts. Such clarification can be from stylized facts on the one hand and on the Fosu 
conjectures on the other. From the perspective of stylized facts, average growth in African 
countries has been driven primarily by price booms in natural resources (especially in 
petroleum) during the period of study. Unfortunately, most of these resource-rich countries 
have been associated with comparatively lower degrees of inclusive development from the 
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health and social perspectives. For instance, consistent with Ndikumana and Boyce (2012), 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of Congo are among the most wealthy countries 
in the African continent with (i) per capita incomes of respectively $8,649 (2
nd
), $4,176 (5
th
) 
and $1,253 (15
th
)  and (ii) substantial reserves in oil with Gabon ranking 7
th
, the Congo 
Republic ranking 8
th
  and Equatorial Guinea ranking 10
th
. This is in sharp contrast to the 
inclusive human development levels enjoyed by these countries because most citizens are 
living in poverty.  Accordingly, these citizens lack drinkable water, health care, decent 
sanitation and elementary schools. The second and third to the last in terms of immunization 
against measles are Gabon and Equatorial Guinea with 55 percent and 51 percent rates 
respectively. Moreover, the odds of a child reaching his/her fifth birthday in Equatorial 
Guinea are higher than the African average. Recent rankings on quality of growth from 
Mlachila et al. (2014, p.17) confirm these formalized ideas. Such rankings show that inclusive 
development has been deteriorating in the three resource-rich countries. The performance of 
these three countries in a sample of 93 developing nations from 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-
2004 and 2005-2011 shows a considerable degradation in  inclusive development: Congo 
Republic (59
th
, 70
th
, 74
th
 & 84
th
);  Equatorial Guinea (76
th
, 73
rd
, 76
th
  & 88
th
)  and Gabon (58
th
, 
61
st
, 67
th
 & 69
th
).  
 In the light of the above, it is not surprising that the growth experienced by these 
resource-wealthy countries is not trickling down to the poor. This can be explained by the 
Fosu conjectures. In essence, exclusive development can be elucidated from the perspective 
that the response of poverty to growth is a decreasing function of inequality.  This is also due 
to the fact that economic growth is globalisation-driven. Income distribution is fundamental in 
the effect of growth on poverty (Fosu, 2015a; Fosu, 2011). This is consistent with the view 
that inclusiveness plays a fundamental role in the poverty-growth nexus (Fosu, 2015a; Fosu, 
2010b). In more specific terms:  “The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income 
is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010c, p. 818); “The responsiveness of poverty 
to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is 
actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010a, p. 1432) and “In general, 
high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while 
growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11). 
It follows that the recent growth resurgence has not benefited African countries because of 
low initial levels of inclusive human development or high initial levels of inequality.   
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The findings in this study have overwhelmingly confirmed the tested hypotheses. It 
follows that for each fundamental characteristic, one sub-panel is more of a policy syndrome 
in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda. Accordingly, more resources need to be 
devoted to support: low income, French civil law, landlocked, Islam-oriented, oil-rich and 
politically unstable countries.  
 For these policy syndromes
3
, domestic as well as foreign policies could be tailored 
towards addressing binding constraints to an improved globalisation-inclusiveness 
relationship. Such binding constraints could be the lack of financial resources needed for 
human capability development, provision of public commodities and social mobility among 
others. Given the apparent issues of governance in inclusive development, such financial 
resources would need to be aligned more for the improvement of economic governance which 
is the formulation and implementation of measures that enable an effective delivery of public 
commodities such as education and health facilities.  
 
5. Conclusions and future research directions 
 
This study has examined the impact of globalisation on inclusive human development in 51 
African countries for the period 1996-2011, with particular emphasis on income levels (low 
income versus middle income), legal origins (English common law versus French civil law), 
resource wealth (oil-rich versus oil-poor), landlockedness (landlocked versus unlandlocked), 
religious domination (Christianity versus Islam) and political stability (stable versus unstable). 
The empirical evidence is based on instrumental variable panel Fixed effects and Tobit 
regressions in order to control for the unobserved heteroegeneity and limited range in the 
dependent variable. Political, economic, social and general globalisation variables are used. 
Six main hypotheses are investigated. The findings broadly show that middle income, English 
common law, oil-poor, unlandlocked, Christian-oriented and politically-stable countries are 
associated with comparatively high levels of globalisation-driven inclusive human 
development. Puzzling findings are clarified and policy implications discussed.   
                                                          
3
 Whereas Fosu (2013a) has defined policy syndromes as situations that are detrimental to growth in Africa, 
Asongu (2015c) has conceived policy syndromes as fundamental characteristics needing more resources in order 
to achieve a particular target. The conception of policy syndrome in this study is consistent with both authors 
because the identified fundamental characteristics are comparatively more detrimental to enjoying the inclusive 
benefits of globalisation and hence, more resources are needed to support them.  
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 It is important to highlight that whereas indicators on African development may be of 
poor quality and unreliable, to the best of our knowledge those from the World Bank and 
United Nations Development Program are comparatively less unreliable. In essence, low 
capacity and lack of funding are the main drivers of data gap in the continent (Beegle et al., 
2016).  
 Future studies can improve the tie between globalisation and inclusive human 
development by investigating the relationship throughout the conditional distributions of 
inclusive human development. The motivation for this future direction is that blanket policies 
based on mean effects may not succeed unless they are contingent on initial values of 
inclusive development and hence tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate 
and high initial levels of inclusive development.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurement) Sources 
    
Inclusive human 
development   
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index  
UNDP 
    
Political 
Globalisation 
Polglob “This captures the extent of political globalisation in terms of 
number of foreign embassies in a country, membership in 
international orgnisations, participation in UN security”.  
 
Dreher et al. (2010) 
 
    
Economic 
Globalisation 
Ecoglob “Overall economic globalisation (considers both the flow and 
the restrictions in a given country to derive this). The higher, 
the better social globalisation”. 
Dreher et al. (2010) 
 
    
Social  
Globalisation 
Socglob “Overall scores for the countries extent of social 
globalisation. The higher the better socially globalised the 
country”. 
Dreher et al. (2010) 
 
    
Globalisation  Glob This is an overall index that contains economic globalisation, 
social globalisation and political globalisation 
Dreher et al. (2010) 
 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign aid    Aid Total Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment Pub. Ivt. Gross Public Investment (% of Grosss) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Inflation Annual Consumer Price Inflation  World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. UNDP: United Nations Development Program.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1996-2011) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Inclusive Human Development  1.521 6.926 0.127 0.809 553 
Political Globalisation (IV)   58.696 17.576 22.439 93.575 765 
Economic Globalisation (IV) 44.991 12.643 14.041 84.229 645 
Social Globalisation (IV) 28.865 11.113 6.582 65.004 765 
Globalisation (IV) 41.775 9.881 18.774 68.453 756 
Education(SSE) 40.941 26.892 4.022 123.893 491 
Mobile phone penetration  19.829 29.390 0.000 171.515 811 
GDP growth  4.863 7.297 -32.832 106.279 792 
Population growth  2.317 1.007 -1.081 9.770 816 
Foreign aid   10.212 12.245 -0.251 147.054 791 
Public Investment  7.491 4.692 0.000 43.011 713 
Inflation  54.723 925.774 -9.797 24411.03 717 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 442) 
          
IVPolglob IVEcoglob IVSocglob IVGlob GDPg Aid Pub.Ivt. Inflation IHDI  
1.000 0.062 0.276 0.604 0.011 -0.211 0.043 0.022 0.118 IVPolglob 
 1.000 0.643 0.769 -0.006 -0.329 0.066 -0.0003 0.297 IVEcoglob 
  1.000 0.854 -0.058 -0.471 -0.029 0.016 0.273 IVSocglob 
   1.000 -0.022 -0.452 0.038 0.017 0.310 IVGlob 
    1.000 0.198 0.276 -0.113 -0.026 GDPg 
     1.000 0.209 -0.002 -0.170 Aid 
      1.000 -0.082 -0.128 Pub. Ivt. 
       1.000 -0.011 Inflation 
        1.000 IHDI 
          
IV: Instrumented value. Polgov: Political Globalisation. Ecoglob: Economic Globalisation. Socglob: Social Globalisation.  Glob: 
Globalisation. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. Mobile: Mobile Phone Penetration.  GDPg: Gross Domestic Product growth.  Popg: 
Population growth.  Aid: Foreign aid.  Pub. Ivt: Public Investment. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index.  
 
 
Appendix 4: Categorization of Countries 
Categories  Panels Countries Num 
 
 
Income 
levels 
   
Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, , 
Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.  
   21 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
30 
    
 
Legal 
Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    19 
   
 
French Civil-
law  
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
32 
    
    
 
Religion  
Christianity  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, 
South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
31 
 
   
Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Libya , Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia,  
20 
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 
   
 
Non-
Petroleum 
Exporting  
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
41 
    
 Conflict  Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
  12 
   
21 
 
Stability   
 
Non-Conflict  
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros,  
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,  Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Senegal, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia. 
 
39 
    
 
Openness to 
Sea 
Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 
   
 
Not 
landlocked 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,  Seychelles, South Africa, Togo, 
Tunisia. 
 
36 
    
Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
 
 
References  
Agbor, J. A. (2015). “How does colonial origin matter for economic performance in sub- 
Saharan Africa?”, In Augustin K. Fosu (Ed.), Growth and Institutions in African 
Development, Chapter 13, pp. 309-327, Routledge Studies in Development Economics: New 
York. 
 
Amavilah, V. H. (2015). Social Obstacles to Technology, Technological Change, and the 
Economic Growth of African Countries: Some Anecdotal Evidence from Economic History, 
MPRA Paper No. 63273, Munich.  
 
America, R., (2013). “Economic Development with Limited Supplies of Management. What 
to do about it - the case of Africa”, Challenge, 56(1), pp. 61-71. 
 
Anand, R.,  Mishra, S., &  Spatafora, N., (2012), “Structural Transformation and 
the Sophistication of Production,” IMF Working Paper No. 12/59, Washington. 
 
Anyanwu, J., & Erhijakpor, A., (2014). “Does Oil Wealth Affect Democracy in 
Africa?”African Development Review, 26 (1), pp. 15-37. 
 
Ariss, R. T. (2010). “On the Implications of Market Power in Banking: Evidence from 
Developing Countries”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 34(4), pp. 765-775.  
 
Arvis, J-F., Marteau, J-F., & Raballand, G. (2007). The cost of being landlocked: logistics 
costs and supply chain reliability”, Word Bank Working Paper Series No. 4258, Washington.  
 
Asongu, S.A. (2013), “Globalization and Africa: implications for human development”, 
International Journal of Development Issues, 12(3), pp. 213-238.  
 
Asongu, S. A. (2014a). “Financial development dynamic thresholds of financial globalisation: 
evidence from Africa”, Journal of Economics Studies, 41(2), pp. 166-195.  
22 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014b). “Globalisation (fighting) corruption and development. How are these 
phenomena linearly and non-linearly related in wealth effects?”, Journal of Economic Studies, 
41(3), pp.  346-369.  
Asongu, S. A., (2014c). “African development: beyond income convergence”, South African 
Journal of Economics, 82(3), pp. 334-353.  
Asongu, S. A., (2015a). “Reinventing foreign aid for inclusive and sustainable development: 
Kuznets, Piketty and the great policy reversal”, Journal of Economic Surveys:  
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/joes.12109/abstract  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2015b). “Law, Finance, Economic Growth and Welfare: Why Does Legal 
Origin Matter?”, Institutions and Economies, 7(2), pp. 30-55.   
 
Asongu, S. A., (2015c). “Knowledge Economy Gaps, Policy Syndromes, and Catch-Up 
Strategies: Fresh South Korean Lessons to Africa”, Journal of Knowledge Economy,  
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13132-015-0321-0  
 
Asongu, S. A., Efobi, U., & Breecroft, I., (2015). “Inclusive Human Development in Pre-
crisis Times of Globalization-driven Debts”, African Development Review, 27(4), pp. 428-442 
 
Asongu, S. A., &  De Moor, L., (2016). “Financial globalisation dynamic thresholds for 
financial development: evidence from Africa”, The European Journal of Development 
Research. DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2016.10. 
Asongu, S. A., &  Nwachukwu, J., (2015a). “Revolution empirics: predicting the Arab 
Spring” Empirical Economics: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00181-015-1013-0  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016a). “Foreign aid and inclusive development: 
updated evidence from Africa, 2005-2012”, Social Science Quarterly: DOI: 
10.1111/ssqu.12275.  
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016b). “The Role of Governance in Mobile Phones for 
Inclusive Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Technovation, 55-56 (September-
October), pp. 1-13. 
 
Asongu, S. A., & Nwachukwu, J. C., (2016c). “Finance and Inclusive Human Development: 
Evidence from Africa”, Brussels Economic Review: Forthcoming. 
   
Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T., Saez, E. (2011). “Top Incomes in the Long Run of History”, 
Journal of Economics Literature, 49(1), pp. 3-71. 
 
Azzimonti, M., De Francisco, E., & Quadrini, V. (2014). “Financial Globalisation, Inequality 
and the Rising Public Debt”, American Economic Review, 104(8), pp. 2267-2302.    
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2003). Law and finance: why does legal origin 
matter?, Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), 653-675. 
 
23 
 
Beegle, K., Christiaensen, L., Dabalen, A., &  Gaddis, I., (2016). “Poverty in a Rising 
Africa”, Africa Poverty Report, the World Bank, Washington.  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/poverty-rising-africa-poverty-report 
(Accessed: 23/07/2016). 
 
Carson, R. T., & Sun, Y. (2007). “The Tobit model with a non-zero threshold”, Econometrics 
Journal, 10(3), pp. 488-502. 
 
CIA (2011). Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2011. 
 
Coccorese, P., & Pellecchia, A. (2010). “Testing the ‘Quiet Life’ Hypothesis in the Italian 
Banking Industry”,  Economic Notes by Banca dei Paschi di Siena SpA, 39(3), pp. 173-202.  
 
Dreher, A., Gaston,  N., Martens, P., & Van Boxem, L., (2010). “Measuring Globalization – 
Opening the Black Box. A Critical Analysis of Globalization Indices”,  Journal of 
Globalization Studies, 1(1), pp.  166-185.  
 
Efobi, U., (2015). “Politicians’ Attributes and Institutional Quality in Africa: A Focus on 
Corruption”, Journal of Economic Issues, 49(3), pp. 787-813.  
 
Fields, G., (2015). “Aid, Growth and Jobs”, African Development Review, Supplement: 
Special Issue on “Aid and Employment”, 27,( S1), pp. 5-16. 
 
Firebaugh, G., (2004), “Accounting for the recent decline in global income inequality”, 
American Journal of Sociology, 110(2), pp. 283-312. 
Fonchingong, C., (2014). “Firming Up Institutional Policy for Deprived Elderly in 
Cameroon”, Politics & Policy, 42(6), pp. 948-980. 
 
Fosu, A. K., (2015a). “Growth, Inequality and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent 
Progress in a Global Context”, Oxford Development Studies, 43(1), pp. 44-59. 
 
Fosu, A., (2015b). Growth and Institutions in African Development, First edited by Augustin 
K. Fosu, , Routledge Studies in Development Economics: New York  
 
Fosu, A., (2015c). Growth and institutions in African Development, in Growth and 
Institutions in African Development, First edited by Augustin K. Fosu, 2015, Chapter 1, pp. 
1-17, Routledge Studies in Development Economics: New York. 
 
Fosu, A., (2013a), “Growth of African Economies: Productivity, Policy Syndromes and the 
Importance of Institutions” Journal of African Economies, 22(4), pp. 523-551. 
 
Fosu, A. (2013b). Achieving development success: Strategies and lessons from the 
developing world, UNU-WIDER Policy Brief (November), Helsinki.  
 
Fosu, A. K. (2008). “Inequality and the Growth-Poverty Nexus: Specification Empirics Using 
African Data”, Applied Economics Letters, 15(7), pp. 563-566.  
 
Fosu, A. K. (2009). “Inequality and the Impact of Growth on Poverty: Comparative Evidence 
for Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of Development Studies, 45(5), pp. 726-745.  
24 
 
 
Fosu, A. K. (2010a). “Inequality, Income and Poverty: Comparative Global Evidence”, Social 
Sciences Quarterly, 91(5), pp. 1432-1446.  
 
Fosu, A. K. (2010b). “The Effect of Income Distribution on the Ability of Growth to Reduce 
Poverty: Evidence from Rural and Urban African Economies”, American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, 69(3), pp. 1034-1053.  
 
Fosu, A. K. (2010c). “Does Inequality Constrain Poverty Reduction Programs? Evidence 
from Africa”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 32(6), pp. 818-827.  
 
Fosu, A. K., (2011). “Growth, Inequality and Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries: 
Recent Global Evidence”, UNU WIDER Working Paper 2011/01, Helsinki.  
 
Grennes, T. (2003), “Creative destruction and globalization”, Cato Journal, 22(3), 
pp. 543-558. 
 
Jones, S., Page, J., Shimeles, A., & Tarp, F., (2015). “Aid, Growth and Employment in 
Africa”, African Development Review, Supplement: Special Issue on “Aid and Employment”, 
27,( S1), pp. 1-4. 
Jones, S., & Tarp, F., (2015). “Priorities for Boosting Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Evidence for Mozambique”, African Development Review, Supplement: Special Issue on “Aid 
and Employment”, 27,( S1), pp. 56-70. 
Kenneth, R., & Himes, O. F. M., (2008). “Globalization with a Human Face: Catholic Social 
Teaching and Globalization”, Theological Studies, 69(2), pp.  269-289. 
  
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E. S., Rogoff, K., & Wei, S. J. (2006). “Financial globalization: a 
reappraisal”, IMF Staff Papers 56(1), pp. 8-62. 
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E. S., & Taylor, A. D. (2011). “Threshold in the process of international 
financial integration”, Journal of International Money and Finance 30(1), pp.147-179. 
 
Koetter, M., Kolari, J. W., & Spierduk, L. (2008). Efficient Competition ? Testing the ‘Quiet 
Life’ of U.S Banks with Adjusted Lerner Indices, Proceedings of the 44th ‘Bank Structure and 
Competition’ Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.  
 
Kuada, J. (2015). Private Enterprise-Led Economic Development, In J. Kuada (Ed.), Sub-
Saharan Africa The Human Side of Growth, Palgrave Macmillan: New York. 
 
Kumbhakar, S. C., & Lovell, C. A. K. (2000). Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Cambridge MA: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). “Law and finance”, 
Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155.  
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1999). “The quality of 
government”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1), pp. 222-279. 
 
25 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A., (2008), “The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origin,” Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2), pp. 285-332. 
 
Lalountas, D.A., Manolas, G.A., & Vavouras, I. S., (2011), “ Corruption, globalization and 
development: How are these three phenomena related?”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 33(4), 
pp. 636-648. 
 
Leautier, F. A., (2012). “What Role for Africa After 50 Years of Independence: Provider of 
Natural Resources or a New Global Leader?”, Journal of African Development, 14(1), pp. 
127-151. 
 
Lewis, A. (1955). Theory of Economic Growth. Milton Park: Routledge. 
 
McDonald, J. (2009). “Using Least Squares and Tobit in Second Stage DEA Efficiency 
Analyses”, European Journal of Operational Research, 197(2), pp.792-798.  
 
Mishra, S., Gable, S. L., & Anand, R., (2011), “Service Export Sophsitication and Economic 
Growth,” World Bank Policy Working Paper No. 5606, Washington.  
 
Mlachila, M., Tapsoba, R., & Tapsoba, S. J. A., (2014). “A Quality of Growth Index for 
Developing Countries: A Proposal”, IMF Working Paper No. 14/172, Washington.   
 
Mthuli, N., Anyanwu,  J. C., & Hausken, K. (2014). “Inequality, Economic Growth and 
Poverty in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)”, African Development Review, 26(3), 
pp. 435-453.  
 
Ndikumana, L., & Boyce, J. K., (2012) “Rich Presidents of Poor Nations: Capital Flight from 
Resource-Rich Countries in Africa”, Department of Economics and Political Economy 
Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst.  
http://concernedafricascholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/caploss01-ndiku-14th.pdf 
(Accessed: 28/12/2014).  
 
Obeng-Odoom, F. (2015). “Africa: On the Rise, but to Where?”, Forum for Social 
Economics, 44(3), pp. 234-250.  
 
Page, J., & Shimeles, A., (2015). “Aid, Employment and Poverty Reduction in Africa”, 
African Development Review, Supplement: Special Issue on “Aid and Employment”, 27,(S1), 
pp. 17-30. 
Page, J., & Söderbom, M., (2015). “Is Small Beautiful? Small Enterprise, Aid and 
Employment in Africa”, African Development Review, Supplement: Special Issue on “Aid and 
Employment”, 27,(S1), pp. 44-55. 
Pesaran, M. H., (2006). “Estimation and inference in large heterogeneous panels with a mul- 
tifactor error structure”. Econometrica 74(4), pp. 967-1012. 
 
Petras, J., &  Veltmeyer, H., (2001), Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st 
Century,Zed Books, London. 
 
26 
 
Piketty, T. (2014). “Capital in the Twenty First Century”, Harvard University Press.  
 
Pinkivskiy, M., & Sala-i-Martin, X., (2014). “Africa is on time”, Journal of Economic 
Growth, 19(3), pp. 311-333. 
 
Price, G. N., & Elu, J. U. (2014). “Does regional currency integration ameliorate global 
macroeconomic shocks in sub-Saharan Africa? The case of the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis”, Journal of Economic Studies, 41(5), pp. 737-750. 
 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. & Trebbi, F., (2004), “Institution rule: the primacy of 
institutions over geography and integration in economic development”, Journal of Economic 
Growth, 9(2), pp. 131-165. 
 
Roudometof, V., (2014). “Religion and globalisation”, in The SAGE Handbook of 
Globalisation, Edited by Steger, M., Battersby, P., & Siracusa, J., Chapter 10, pp. 151-165, 
SAGE Publications: London.   
 
Scholte , J. A. (2000), Globalisation: A Critical Introduction, St. Martin’s Press Inc, New 
York, NY. 
 
Seneviratne, D., &  Sun, Y., (2013), “Infrastructure and Income Distribution in ASEAN-5: 
What are the Links?” IMF Working Paper No. 13/41, Washington.  
 
Simpasa, A, Shimeles, A., & Salami, A. O., “Employment Effects of Multilateral 
Development Bank Support: The Case of the African Development Bank”, African 
Development Review, Supplement: Special Issue on “Aid and Employment”, 27,( S1), pp. 31-
43. 
Sirgy, M.J., Lee, D.J., Miller, C., &  Littlefield, J. E., (2004), “The impact of globalization on 
a country’s quality of life: toward an integrated model”, Social Indictors Research, 68(3) 
pp. 251-298. 
 
Smart, B. (2003), Economy, Culture and Society: A Sociological Critique of Neo-liberalism, 
Open Univesity Press, Buckingham. 
 
Stiglitz, J. (2000). “Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth and Instability”, World 
Development, 28(6), pp. 1075-1086.  
Tchamyou, V. S., (2015). “The role of knowledge economy in African business”, African 
Governance and Development Institute Working Paper No. 15/049, Yaoundé.  
 
Tobin, J. (1958). “Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables”. Econometrica 
26(1), pp. 24-36. 
 
Tsai, M. (2006), Does Globalisation Affect Human Well-being? Department of Sociology, 
National Taipei University, Taiwan. 
 
27 
 
United Nations (2013). “A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform 
Economies Through Sustainable Development”,  The Report of the High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda.  
http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf (Accessed: 07/12/2014). 
 
World Bank (2015). “World Development Indicators”, World Bank Publications 
http://www.gopa.de/fr/news/world-bank-release-world-development-indicators-2015  
(Accessed: 25/04/2015).  
 
 
